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Abstract: On April 21, 2010, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released a 
Notice of Inquiry (NOI) and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that seek the 
public's input on the FCC's effort to replace the legacy high-cost universal service fund 
(USF) with a broadband "Connect America" fund (CAF). In effect, the FCC seeks to 
implement cost-cutting measures for existing voice support (USF) and create a new fund 
(CAF) to support the provision of broadband communications in areas that would be 
unserved without such support or that depend on USF support for the maintenance of 
existing broadband service. An initial review of the NOI/NPRM raises a number of key 
economic and legal considerations. In the following, we identify some of the 
considerations, questions, and challenges raised by the FCC's USF reform attempt, which 
is likely to have far-reaching consequences not only for operators that currently rely on 
USF subsidies or broadband providers in high-cost regions but for the entire 
communications industry. 
The purpose of this note is not to provide an all-inclusive list of, or responses to, the 
critical questions raised by the NOI/NPRM, but rather to illustrate the complexities of this 
proceeding and the impact the proposed reforms may have on industry performance. As 
the CAF is necessary for the success of the FCC's National Broadband Plan (NBP), the 
policy directions taken by the FCC in establishing it are critically important. USF reform is 
also essential to the performance and competitiveness of the U.S. communications 
industry and policy missteps could have serious economic and legal consequences. 
Key words: universal service fund, national broadband plan, connect America fund, 
universal service economic and legal issues. 
 
he Telecommunications Act of 1996 mandated specific universal 
service goals to: promote the availability of quality services at just, 
reasonable, and affordable rates for all consumers; increase 
nationwide access to advanced telecommunications services; advance the 
availability of such services to all consumers, including those in low-income, 
rural, insular, and high-cost areas at rates that are reasonably comparable to 
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those charged in urban areas; increase access to telecommunications and 
advanced services in schools, libraries, and rural health care facilities; and 
provide equitable and nondiscriminatory contributions from all providers of 
telecommunications services to the fund supporting universal service 
programs. 1 The FCC established four programs to fulfill these goals: high-
cost program, low-income program, schools and libraries program, and the 
rural health care program. These programs are funded by the Universal 
Service Fund. Telecommunications providers must contribute to the fund 
through an assessment on their interstate and international revenues. 
In May 2010, the FCC delivered to Congress a National Broadband Plan 
(NBP), which recommended that the FCC adopt cost-cutting measures for 
existing voice support and create a Connect America Fund (CAF) without 
increasing the overall size of the Universal Service Fund (USF) to support 
the provision of broadband communications in areas that would be unserved 
without such support or that depend on universal service support for the 
maintenance of existing broadband service. At issue is how the FCC should 
go about implementing the NBP and creating a CAF. 
Following is a brief discussion of the events surrounding the 
establishment of the USF in the United States after the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996. When establishing the USF, the FCC had to address a number 
of key economic and legal considerations with regard to narrowband voice 
services such as: 
1.  How to determine the universal service support levels in areas where 
there was no private business case to provide services? 
2. What policy incentives should be put in place to ensure the efficient 
and prompt deployment of services in areas that were currently not being 
served? 
Now, the era of broadband is upon us. In order to implement its NBP and 
create a CAF, the FCC once again must address the same two questions as 
above only with regard to broadband services. In addition, it must also figure 
out: 
3.  How to reform the current USF program and direct any savings from 
this effort towards broadband deployment? 
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The remainder of the paper focuses on the key economic and legal 
issues that the FCC must address when establishing the CAF. 
   Background 
The 1934 Communications Act created and empowered the FCC to 
regulate "interstate […] communications […] to make available, so far as 
possible, to all the people of the United States, a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, 
and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate 
facilities at reasonable charges [...]." (Section 151 of the Communications 
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151). However, the 1934 Act prescribed no 
mechanism for doing so. 2  What evolved over the years was a complex web 
of implicit subsidies from long distance to local telephone service, from 
business to residential, and from urban and suburban to rural areas. 
The desire to keep local rates low and avoid rate shock was (and is) a 
key goal of policy makers who sought to keep rates low by using a variety of 
implicit subsidy mechanisms for basic residential services. This included 
charging higher (above-cost) rates for business services; allowing LECs to 
charge above-cost prices for intrastate toll calls, intrastate access charges, 
and vertical features, such as call forwarding and call waiting; allowing, and 
requiring, geographic rate averaging and value of service pricing to provide 
subsidies from high-density (urban) to low-density (rural) areas (HUBER, 
KELLOGG & THORNE, 1999, p. 552, note 45).  
For example, as long distance costs declined relative to local service 
costs in the first half of the 1900s, public policy makers decided to take 
advantage of those cost reductions to "promote the social goal of universal 
service" by lowering local rates rather than fully flowing through long 
distance cost savings via lower long distance charges (KASERMAN & 
                       
2 Indeed, according to a June 1984 Congressional Budget Office Study, "Although the goal of 
universal service does not specifically appear in the language of the … 1934 [Act], it is widely 
accepted. In its [1982] access charge decision, the FCC decided that universal service had 
existed for several years and the commission was responsible for ensuring that such service 
continued." U.S. Congressional Budget Office, "The Changing Telephone Industry: Access 
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MAYO, 1995).  3  In order to do this, a complex set of internal subsidies 
known as the "separations and settlements" process was created.  
"Under this system, a portion of local company costs was 'separated' 
out and assigned to long distance services to be recovered through 
per-minute charges in AT&T's long distance rates [….] AT&T would 
use the inflated revenues from long distance calling to 'settle' 
(subsidize) the local exchange companies." (KASERMAN & MAYO, 
1995, p. 597) 4 
With the advent of competition for long distance services and the breakup 
of AT&T, internal revenue sharing (via separations and settlements) was no 
longer sustainable. Thus, the breakup of the former Bell System, growing 
competition, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act) led to the 
replacement of the implicit subsidies with more explicit ones in the form of 
universal service funds, especially at the federal level. As the 1996 Act 
specifies:  
"[there] should be specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and state 
mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service." In defining 
the states' authority with regard to universal service, the Act states that 
"[e]very telecommunications carrier that provides intrastate 
telecommunications services shall contribute, on an equitable and 
nondiscriminatory basis, to the preservation and enhancement of 
universal service in that state." (Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. 
LA. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 1996). 
Universal service has been defined as "the provision of some set of basic 
local services to all customers at an affordable price [… or] making local 
telephone service available to all consumers at a reasonable cost . […]" 
(HUBER, KELLOGG & THORNE, 1999, pp. 541-43). The economics 
literature generally recognizes that one purpose of a universal service policy 
is to correct for "network externalities." That is, all users benefit when 
another user is added to the network because each subscriber will be able to 
communicate with the added customer. The potential new user, however, 
                       
3 Moreover, according to KASERMAN & MAYO, "Before the 1930s, local companies recovered 
all of their costs of providing these services through the rates they charged. Similarly, long-
distance rates were set to recover the costs of long-distance service […]. But […] the costs of 
long distance transmission fell sharply. In a competitive industry, the rate structure would have 
been driven to mimic the changing costs: Long distance rates would have fallen relative to local 
rates. Instead, within the closed (regulated monopoly) system it was believed that cost 
reductions in long distance service could best promote the social goal of universal service by 
shifting at least some of the savings to local telephone services." 
4 As the authors point out, the separations process relied on a fully allocated cost process, 
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compares the price he is required to pay only to his private benefits, ignoring 
the external benefits his subscription confers on other users. This is the 
theoretical basis for providing subsidies to consumers (such as low-income 
customers or those living in high-cost areas) who would not subscribe to 
telephone service at cost-based rates (See, for example, WILLIG, 1979; 
LAFFONT & TIROLE, 2000). Because the value of a network increases with 
the number of customers on the network, economic principles provide some 
support for keeping basic local service somewhat lower than the level that 
would be set in a competitive market. 
However, which services should be covered by universal service policies 
and what is meant by an affordable or reasonable price are controversial 
subjects. Effectively, though, the current universal service program is limited 
to narrowband local voice service. It does not include, at present, broadband 
services. This exclusion is the underlying motivation for the FCC's current 
reform attempt. 
In the present proceeding, the FCC seeks to expand the concept of 
universal service to include broadband services. This, in turn, raises some of 
the same questions the FCC faced after the 1996 Act (and earlier) when 
establishing the USF for narrowband local voice services. Specifically, 14 
years later, the FCC is faced once again with the following policy decisions: 
1.  How should the FCC determine the universal service support levels in 
areas where there is no private business case to provide broadband 
services? 
2. What policy incentives should the FCC put in place to ensure the 
efficient and prompt deployment of broadband services in areas that are 
currently unserved? 
3.  How should the FCC reform the current USF program and direct any 
savings from this effort towards broadband deployment? 
These highly complex questions require careful economic and legal 
consideration. Policy measures based on flawed economic analyses are at 
best superfluous and at worst counterproductive because an improperly 
structured CAF could jeopardize the objectives of the NBP and have serious 
economic consequences for the U.S. telecommunications industry. Similarly, 
as evidenced by the FCC's implementation of the 1996 Act and more 
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Internet, any reform or expansion of universal service is likely to spark many 
challenges that could delay, or potentially annul, the FCC's NBP efforts. 
In the following, we discuss some of the key economic and legal aspects 
that the FCC faces in designing a regulatory framework responsive to the 
three questions above. We examine the first question next. 
How should the FCC determine the universal service support levels in areas 
where there is no private business case to provide broadband services? 
The NOI/NPRM are the FCC's first in a series of proceedings designed to 
encourage investment in, and the deployment of, broadband infrastructure to 
areas in which it is lacking. Public comment is sought to assist the FCC in 
developing "the detailed analytic foundation necessary for the Commission 
to distribute funds in an efficient, targeted manner that avoids waste and 
minimizes burdens on American consumers." (NOI/NPRM ¶ 2). Accordingly, 
the FCC first asks whether service support levels (i.e., the CAF) should be 
determined based on the use of "a model as a competitively neutral and 
efficient tool for helping us to quantify the minimum amount of universal 
service support necessary to support networks that provide broadband and 
voice services, such that the contribution burden that ultimately falls on 
American consumers is limited." (NOI/NPRM ¶ 13).  
Cost models have been widely used not only in the U.S., but also 
worldwide, in resolving similar regulatory questions. In the U.S., regulators 
have used cost models to set interconnection rates for fixed-line carriers and 
for determining the size of the current USF. Internationally, regulators have 
used cost models to set fixed and mobile interconnection rates and to 
determine wholesale network access rates and national roaming rates. We 
are not aware of any country that has used cost models for broadband 
services offered by significantly different technologies. In fact, cost models 
have been limited to either wireline or wireless telecommunications services. 
In wireline, the cost structures of copper and fiber networks are calculated. 
In wireless, the cost structures of GSM, CDMA, iDen, WCDMA, and 
CDMA2000 networks have been modeled. We are also not aware of any 
attempt by regulators to derive technology neutral policies in a converging 
environment using a cost modeling approach. This would require the 
blending of significantly different technologies and cost structures, such as 
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Nevertheless, there are two basic types of cost models—top down and 
bottom up. A top-down model is essentially a financial/accounting model that 
starts with actual investments and costs and attempts to make adjustments 
to reflect a forward-looking approach. A bottom-up model is an engineering 
model that designs a forward-looking network without reference to existing 
network facilities. The bottom-up modeling methodology derives the costs of 
an efficient operator using least-cost equipment and technology. The main 
advantages of the bottom-up approach are that it transparently captures the 
linkages between service volumes and costs and avoids the inclusion of 
inefficiently incurred and legacy costs. If modeled at a sufficiently 
disaggregated level and correctly specified, a bottom-up model can provide 
an accurate representation of the way output levels drive individual costs. In 
contrast, the linkages between costs and volumes in a top-down model are 
more complex and less transparent. In addition, because a top-down model 
is based on actual costs, it includes inefficiencies and legacy costs. On the 
other hand, the complexity of the relationships between volumes and costs 
in a top-down model removes the danger of oversimplification that can occur 
in bottom-up models, particularly in the case of operating expenses. A 
further potential advantage of top-down models is that they can be 
integrated with accounting separations systems and provide repeatable 
results to a specified timetable. There are advantages and disadvantages for 
both types of models, and international best practices have often combined 
the two model types to form a hybrid model. 
If the FCC decides to use a model to size the CAF, it should address 
several key issues. For instance: 
•  Where to provide broadband subsidies? The NBP seeks to provide 
funding only "in geographic areas where there is no private sector business 
case to provide broadband and high-quality voice-grade service." 
(NOI/NPRM ¶ 10). Unlike a market-based mechanism, the FCC will have to 
identify areas that will receive funding. For this, it can use density zones (as 
it did for legacy USF purposes), a regional approach (e.g., counties, as 
proposed by the FCC for future CAF subsidies) (NOI/NPRM ¶¶ 41-43), or 
some other geographic identifier. Furthermore, the FCC will require a 
detailed model that identifies supply gaps throughout the U.S. We 
understand that the National Broadband Plan Model uses geocoded data to 
identify such gaps. The process of geocoding housing units is also a 
methodology used by the Hybrid Cost Proxy Model (HCPM), which is used 
to size the legacy USF. The authors of this note were directly involved in 
analyzing this past FCC effort and identified multiple shortfalls (some of 
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FCC's National Broadband Plan Model or its "gap analysis," doing so is 
essential to ensure that funding is targeted to areas that actually lack a 
private business case and not areas where proper data were not available or 
where supply has been misidentified. Furthermore, a determination will need 
to be made as to whether areas with no demand should be served. From an 
economic viewpoint, such policy would be inefficient. 
•  How to monitor the performance of subsidized carriers? The NBP 
specifies that "obtaining broadband support from the CAF should be 
company- and technology-agnostic so long as the service provided meets 
the specifications set by the FCC.…" (NOI/NPRM ¶ 10). Implementing this 
objective would require defining and monitoring a set of specifications that 
meet the FCC's requirements. At this point, only an initial minimum 
download speed of 4 Mbps and upload speed of 1 Mbps have been 
specified. The FCC has not stated how it plans to monitor these 
specifications to ensure that they are continually met. No other 
requirements, such as quality of service, have been set. 
•  Which technology will be modeled? A technology neutral CAF raises 
further challenges. Broadband providers (potential CAF subsidy recipients) 
include wireline (fiber or copper), wireless (currently 3G and soon LTE), 
WiMAX (IEEE 802.16), Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11), satellite, cable, fixed wireless, 
and possibly other providers. Based on our experience, the cost structures 
for these providers differ significantly. Hence, should the FCC opt for a cost 
modeling approach, it will need to determine whether to provide a symmetric 
funding regime (where all provider regardless of technology will receive the 
same subsidy) or an asymmetric regime. Adoption of a symmetric regime 
would be consistent with the NBP's recommendation that the CAF be 
technology neutral. However, if the FCC sets the CAF based on the highest-
cost provider, the CAF will overcompensate providers with less costly (but 
possibly limited) technologies. On the other hand, setting the CAF based on 
the least-cost solution might limit subsidies to only some technologies. For 
example, if, for argument's sake, the least-cost technology turns out to be 
WiMAX, it would mean that only WiMAX providers would benefit from the 
CAF. All other technologies effectively would be precluded from entering the 
market because there would be no incentive to do so. If, however, the FCC 
opts for an asymmetric regime, it will need to determine which providers will 
obtain the subsidy because all technologies would have an equal chance of 
receiving funding. 
•  Should a bottom-up, a top-down, or a hybrid model be used? As 
explained above, should the FCC opt for a model, it will need to decide 
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the legacy USF model (HCPM), the FCC used a bottom-up model. 
Operators that had their own top-down models (i.e., starting with embedded 
costs and adjusting to reflect a forward-looking approach) attempted 
repeatedly to illustrate that the costs obtained by the bottom-up model were 
inaccurate. Counter to current international best practices, the FCC did not 
consolidate or calibrate the bottom-up model with the results from the top-
down models. 
•  How will capital costs be modeled—scorched node or scorched earth? 
A bottom-up methodology can use either a scorched node or a scorched 
earth approach.  5  The use of a scorched node approach means that the 
existing node locations (switches, base stations, etc.) are kept, but the 
choice of equipment at and between each node is optimized (i.e., the most 
efficient quantity of radio and switching equipment is installed at each node 
and the most efficient quantity of transmission equipment is used to connect 
the various nodes). In contrast, a scorched earth assumption assumes that 
one starts fresh with the nodes placed at optimal locations and the volume of 
equipment at and between them determined in the most efficient manner. 
•  Should embedded costs be part of the subsidy calculation? The FCC 
seeks comment on whether embedded costs should be part of the subsidy 
calculation. As stated above, international best practices typically take 
embedded costs, or at least a top-down approach, into account when 
consolidating or calibrating the bottom-up model. 
•  How will "forward-looking" capital costs be modeled? Along with 
deciding on the appropriate network topology, it is necessary to define the 
forward-looking technology to be used at and between each network node. 
The Modern Equivalent Asset (MEA) approach is generally employed.  6  
This requires establishing a time horizon for how far into the future one 
should look. Generally speaking, practical considerations and the difficulties 
inherent in predicting future technological developments necessarily limit the 
time horizon that can be employed. International best practices typically take 
a three-year forward-looking approach when defining modern equivalent 
assets for cost modeling purposes. This means that the forward-looking 
technology modeled can be reasonably deployed across the network within 
three years. 
                       
5 In contrast, the top-down approach implicitly assumes a scorched node. 
6 The MEA is the lowest cost asset that serves the same function as the asset being valued. It 
incorporates the latest available technology and is the asset that a new entrant might be 
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•  What increment should be selected for setting subsidies? The choice 
of increment (i.e., total service costs or incremental costs) has a direct 
impact on the allocation of common fixed costs. 
•  How will model input values be obtained? As was evidenced in the 
proceeding that resulted in the adoption of the HCPM, as well as other USF 
cost modeling proceedings at the state level, obtaining accurate input values 
for cost models can be incredibly challenging. First, operators typically do 
not keep their data in a format that can easily be used for cost modeling 
purposes. Second, cost data are highly confidential to operators. Thus, 
operators are frequently reluctant to provide their price points. 
•  How long does the FCC plan to spend on building a model? As 
evidenced by the lengthy debate that took place during the development of 
the HCPM, deriving forward-looking inputs and building a model platform is 
challenging and requires significant time and resources. In light of the NBP's 
objective to deploy broadband networks as rapidly as possible, a cost model 
might jeopardize this objective. 
•  Should the HCPM be updated, should the National Broadband Plan 
Model be used as a starting point, or should a new model be built? The FCC 
seeks comment on whether it should attempt to update the HCPM, use the 
National Broadband Plan Model as a starting point for a new model, or 
develop a new model entirely. As the authors of this note have experienced 
first hand, the accuracy and usefulness of the HCPM is severely limited. 
Furthermore, because it has been over 12 years since the HCPM was 
developed, a new model employing today's modeling techniques and data 
sources should be used instead. The FCC recognizes these shortcomings 
and has stated its preference for developing a new model to estimate CAF 
support levels (NOI/NPRM ¶¶ 31–32);  however, as stated above, a new 
model will require significant time and resources. Should the FCC opt to use 
the National Broadband Plan Model as a starting point, it must also 
determine whether this model can be used, in part with the HCPM or as a 
stand-alone model, to derive the necessary broadband costs. This, in turn, 
will require a careful review of the National Broadband Plan Model and an 
assessment of its compatibility with the HCPM or its flexibility to function as 
a stand-alone cost model. 
•  Should market-based mechanisms be used instead of a cost model? 
The FCC also seeks comment on whether, in lieu of a cost model, it should 
use a market-based mechanism, such as a reverse auction. In a reverse 
auction, qualified broadband providers bid for the obligation to serve a 
certain unserved area and indicate a predetermined CAF subsidy. Unlike a 
forward auction, in a reverse auction, prices typically decline over time. The C. DIPPON, C. HUTHER & M. TROY  77 
winning party is the broadband provider that is willing to serve the areas with 
the lowest CAF subsidy. A reverse auction is a fundamentally superior 
approach to a cost model because it is market based. It allows bidders to 
conduct their own due diligence and determine the minimum CAF subsidy at 
which they are willing to serve a gap region. A market-based approach is 
also more dynamic in that it allows operators to make decisions on a market-
by-market basis. In addition, some of the modeling burden is shifted to the 
bidder who must perform a detailed minimum willingness to accept 
analysis. 7  Conversely, however, reverse auctions are complex to 
implement, and, based on our experience, a detailed review of the auction is 
of crucial importance to all potential bidders. Specifically: 
-  What auction format should be selected? The overall auction design 
must be carefully reviewed to ensure that a proper auction format is 
selected. There are a variety of auction formats that may be used, 
including, but not limited to, sealed bid, multiple-round, and combinatorial 
auctions. We note that combinatorial auctions may be particularly 
interesting for the present purpose as they allow the combination of 
auction licenses. Given the significant economies of scale in the 
communications industry, allowing bidders to combine licenses into lots 
that make the most economic sense to the bidder may be preferable. 
-  How are auction lots determined? The FCC will need to determine the 
appropriate auction lots. These could be individual "gap" regions, a group 
of such regions, or all regions combined into one lot. 
-  What are the auction rules and the terms and conditions of the service 
license? The auction rules must be available for review well in advance of 
the auction. The auction rules must also include the terms and conditions 
of the service license. Specifically, the rules must identify the specific 
conditions that the FCC requires from subsidized broadband operators, 
including upload speeds, download speeds, quality of service, rollout 
obligations, service lead-time, and so on. 
-  Who is allowed to participate in the auction? A prequalification 
process must be put into place. This requires the FCC to determine 
which bidders will be eligible to participate in the auction. Among the 
                       
7 A bidder’s minimum willingness to accept is the lowest CAF subsidy for which a bidder will 
serve a gap region. The minimum willingness to accept analysis must be conducted with the 
regulatory obligations of the service license in mind. Typically bidders rely on a net present 
value type of analysis in which the private business case is reexamined. Generally, the 
minimum willingness to accept is the difference between the business case without a subsidy 
and the required (positive) business case. In essence, the subsidy bridges the gap between the 
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requirements, the FCC might consider financial strength, network size, 
experience, and regulatory compliance. 
-  How are prequalified bidders trained? Prequalified bidders should be 
provided an opportunity to test the auction process in a "mock auction" a 
few weeks prior to the auction. 
-  How will the reserve price be determined? The FCC will need to set a 
reserve price for the reverse auction. The reserve price is the highest 
subsidy amount the FCC is willing to pay for a certain service license. In 
the NOI/NPRM, the FCC seeks comment on whether a cost model 
should be used to determine the auction reserve price (NOI/NPRM ¶ 21). 
In light of the discussion above, using a cost model to set the reserve 
price may be problematic. Most fundamentally, it, again, raises the 
question of which technology will be modeled. Furthermore, given the 
many underlying engineering and economic assumptions in cost models, 
along with the difficulties of obtaining input values, the accuracy of a cost 
model for reserve price purposes is questionable. We note that the 
reserve price is critical to the auction because, by definition, the areas 
that are subject to the service licenses might not attract sufficient bidders. 
Hence, the auction might end at or near the reserve price. 
Next, we look at the second question that the FCC must address. 
What policy incentives should the FCC use to ensure the efficient and prompt 
deployment of broadband services in areas that are currently unserved? 
Likely, in recognition of the fact that a CAF model and an auction will 
require several months (and possibly years) to implement, the FCC is 
considering implementing a fast-track program for broadband operators that 
upgrade their networks in unserved areas. Based on a proposal filed by a 
group of economists (See NOI/NPRM Appendix B), the FCC is considering 
whether a procurement auction would fulfill this fast-track mandate (See 
NOI/NPRM ¶¶ 43–48). Although we do not disagree with the arguments 
made in that paper, it is not clear how the economists' proposal would be 
easier and thus quicker to implement than a reverse auction. In fact, 
combinatorial auctions, as suggested by that paper, tend to be more 
complex to implement than a sealed bid auction or even a multiple-round 
auction. However, we do agree that auctions are quicker to implement than 
cost models. 
Finally, we discuss the third question raised in this paper. C. DIPPON, C. HUTHER & M. TROY  79 
How should the FCC reform the current USF program and direct any savings 
from this effort towards broadband deployment? 
Finally, in the NPRM, the FCC seeks to undertake a "comprehensive 
reform of the current high-cost mechanism." (NOI/NPRM ¶ 49). As the FCC 
and many operators have repeatedly stated, the current high-cost 
mechanism is severely outdated. We concur. However, reforming the 
subsidies that local exchange carriers obtain must be balanced. The FCC 
must carefully examine whether the rationale for providing subsidies still 
applies in today's telecommunications market. Specifically: 
•  Subsidies under the USF program have been implemented so that 
subsidized operators (typically local exchange carriers) can offer their 
services at "affordable" prices. In parallel to the current proceeding, the 
subsidies have also been implemented to ensure that the operators serve 
areas where there may be no private business case for doing so. Hence, by 
removing or capping the subsidies under the legacy fund, the FCC must 
determine whether these underlying motivations still apply. If they do and 
U.S. citizens are still in need of subsidized local exchange rates and rely on 
carriers of last resort in obtaining basic local exchange service, then the 
FCC should consider alternative recovery mechanisms. If they no longer 
apply, the FCC might need to consider terminating the program and allow 
local exchange carriers to price their services according to market forces 
and reserve the right not to serve areas where a private business case does 
not support it. 
•  USF reform should be carefully phased in and should be done in 
parallel with the appropriate changes to the regulatory framework under 
which subsidized carriers operate. For instance, with the reduction, or 
elimination, of interstate access support, the FCC should also ease related 
regulatory constraints imposed on the subsidized carriers. 
•  A shift from rate-of-return regulation to incentive regulation, as 
suggested by the FCC (NOI/NPRM ¶ 55), is generally supported by the 
economic literature. However, any such move must be undertaken with great 
care to avoid a price shock and jeopardize the existence of carriers that are 
still under rate-of-return regulation. 
•  Any revision to, or elimination of, the interstate access fund (IAS) and 
ETC (eligible telecommunications carrier) high-cost support, as proposed by 
the FCC (NOI/NPRM ¶¶ 57–58, 60-61), should be undertaken with the same 
level of care. 80     No. 80, 4
th Q. 2010 
The FCC is moving forward with its NBP. An NPRM was issued July 15, 
2010, on reforms to the universal service health care support mechanism 
that are consistent with the recommendations set forth in the NBP to expand 
the reach and use of broadband connectivity for and by public and nonprofit 
health care providers. 8  
Action by the FCC on September 23, 2010, by Report and Order (FCC 
10-175), makes it easier for schools and libraries to get the highest speeds 
for the lowest prices by increasing their options for broadband providers and 
streamlining the application process. The Order is another advance in the 
Commission's ongoing transformation of the Universal Service Fund, of 
which the E-rate program (formerly the schools and libraries program) is 
part, to deploy broadband throughout America. 
Further action by the Commission on October 14, 2010, by Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (FCC 10-182) is to create the broadband mobility 
fund proposed in its NBP that would provide the FCC with its first opportunity 
to use a reverse auction for awarding USFs to carriers. The reverse auction 
process would award funds to the carrier that requests the smallest amount 
of funding. The NPRM differs from the NBP. The NBP addressed only 
supporting 3G services, whereas the NPRM opens the door for a carrier to 
obtain funding for a 4G network. The cost of the proposed program is 
between $100 million and $300 million, which would come from the USF. 
   Conclusion 
The replacement of the legacy high-cost universal support fund has far-
reaching consequences for the U.S. telecommunications industry. Most 
fundamentally, it introduces a new era where the social objective of universal 
narrowband access is phased out and replaced with universal broadband 
access. This shift in policy, however, requires that old social welfare 
objectives and their associated policies, at a minimum, be revised or 
abandoned altogether. Focusing only on new objectives, such as introducing 
a CAF or broadband services, can have serious competitive consequences. 
For instance, by phasing out the USF, the FCC must also phase out the 
policies that originally gave rise to the creation of the USF. Particularly, 
                       
8 In the Matter of Rural Healthcare Support Mechanism, WC Docket No. 02-60, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 10-125, rel. Jul. 15, 2010. C. DIPPON, C. HUTHER & M. TROY  81 
programs such as universal service and carrier-of-last-resort obligations 
must be phased out along with the USF. Similarly, retail price regulation 
must be reviewed and adapted to the new competitive environment. Ignoring 
these consequential policy effects would seriously damage the industry 
because it would require wireline operators to continue to support high-cost 
areas but deprive them of a compensatory measure. 
As illustrated above, there is a multitude of practical challenges that the 
FCC must overcome in procuring the CAF. Most important among those is 
the competitively neutral identification and compensation of broadband 
subsidies. Who will receive subsidies in what amount has direct competitive 
consequences. An unjustified or excessive subsidy will provide a competitive 
windfall for the recipient, whereas under compensation will competitively 
disadvantage the operator. Finally, the CAF is a critical piece in the FCC's 
NBP as the effectiveness of the plan will be seriously jeopardized without the 
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